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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper provides new insights about security behaviour in selected U.S. and Irish 
organisations by investigating how organisational culture and procedural security 
countermeasures tend to influence employee security actions. An increasing number of 
information security breaches in organisations presents a serious threat to the confidentiality of 
personal and commercially sensitive data. While recent research shows that humans are the 
weakest link in the security chain and the root cause of a great portion of security breaches, the 
extant security literature tends to focus on technical issues. 
Design/methodology/approach Ð This paper builds on general deterrence theory and prior 
organisational culture literature. The methodology adapted for this study draws on the analytical 
grounded theory approach employing a constant comparative method. 
Findings Ð This paper demonstrates that procedural security countermeasures and 
organisational culture tend to affect security behaviour in organisational settings. 
Research implications Ð This paper fills the void in information security research and takes its 
place amongst the very few studies that focus on behavioural as opposed to technical issues. 
Practical implications Ð This paper highlights the important role of procedural security 
countermeasures, information security awareness, and organisational culture in managing illicit 
behaviour of employees. 
Originality value Ð This study extends general deterrence theory in a novel way by including 
information security awareness in the research model and by investigating both negative and 
positive behaviours. 
Keywords 
Employee Security Behaviour, Organisational Culture, Information Security Policy, 
Security Education, Information Security Awareness 
 
1.! Introduction 
Historically, organisations have emphasised a technological approach in order to 
protect the security of their information assets. However, as many attackers have 
                                                            
1
 This research is based upon work done at the National University of Ireland, Galway and the 
University of California, Berkeley  
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started to include social means in their malicious efforts, e.g. social engineering, the 
need for a holistic approach in addressing information security issues has emerged. 
The domain of behavioural information security (InfoSec) research highlights the 
importance of taking into consideration the ÒhumanÓ element when ensuring 
information security throughout the organisation. Research and practice have shown 
that technical tools are powerless when it comes to the enforcement of behavioural 
rules such as password sharing, reporting of security incidents, adherence to a clear 
desk policy, and the secure disposal of confidential documents. Rather, compliance 
with these rules entirely depends on employeesÕ motivation to conform. Therefore, it 
is essential to understand factors that lead to compliant behaviour or that prompt 
employees to break organisational information security rules. This study provides new 
insights about security behaviour in selected U.S. and Irish organisations by 
investigating how organisational culture and procedural security countermeasures 
influence security actions. Crossler et al. (2013, p.90) note that Òalthough a 
predominant weakness in properly securing information assets is the individual user 
within an organization, much of the focus of extant security research is on technical 
issuesÓ. In response, our work takes its place amongst the small number studies to date 
that focus on behavioural as opposed to technical issues. 
Generally, Behavioural InfoSec research falls into two broad categories: (1) those that 
focus on the effects of cognitive processes on employee security behaviour (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010), and (2) the effect of social controls (Cheng et al., 2013). This study 
concentrates on the latter. The two basic forms of social controls are formal and 
informal (Ross, 1896). Formal social controls refer to rules and regulations against 
deviant behaviour (Cheng et al., 2013). Organisational sanctions, rewards, security 
education and training, and information security policies are all forms of formal 
organisational controls. There is an abundance of research within the field of 
Information Systems (IS) on how formal organisational controls influence security 
behaviour. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) and Hu et al. (2011) emphasise the vital role of 
sanctions and rewards in managing security behaviour in organisational settings.  Chen 
et al. (2012) and Siponen et al. (2009) assert the importance of security policies and 
education as factors that deter malicious actions of employees. Our research focuses 
on the effect of information security policies and security education on employee 
security education. Following Hovav and DÕArcy (2012), these security controls are 
collectively referred as Òprocedural security countermeasuresÓ.  
Although Behavioural InfoSec research has seen some expansion in the past few years, 
it is still in a developing phase. Some prior literature provides evidence that procedural 
security countermeasures reduce IS misuse (Straub 1990; Siponen et al., 2009), while 
other studies contradict these findings (Lee et al., 2004). Straub (1990) and Chan et al. 
(2005) found that security policies were associated with lower levels of computer 
abuse. Similarly, Siponen et al. (2009) and Barlow et al. (2013) reported that security 
education is an important predictor of security-compliant behaviour. On the contrary, 
Lee et al. (2004) concluded that security policies and security awareness programs do 
not reduce IS misuse.  
Undeniably, these previous studies are highly informative. However, they investigated 
the direct effect of procedural security countermeasures on employee security 
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behaviour, neglecting the important role of user information security awareness. The 
purpose of an information security policy in conjunction with appropriate security 
education is to increase information security awareness, which, in turn, will promote 
security-cautious behaviour (Barlow et al., 2013). However, within the established 
literature territory, we have not found any empirical studies confirming that security 
policies and security education affect security actions in organisations indirectly 
through information security awareness. Additionally, various IS studies emphasised 
that information security awareness plays an important role in encouraging security-
cautious behaviour (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), while empirical findings appeared to be 
contradictory. For example, although Bulgurcu et al. (2010) reported that usersÕ 
general awareness about information security has a positive effect on their behaviour, 
Lee et al. (2004) asserted that a degree of awareness has no impact on employeesÕ 
security actions. Moreover, there are calls in the literature to Òidentify factors that lead 
to information security awareness as it would be an important contribution to 
academics, since there is a gap in the literature in this directionÓ (Bulgurcu et al., 2010, 
p.543). 
Informal social controls include customs, traditions, norms, morality and other social 
values (Cheng et al., 2013). Researchers from the IS discipline have examined the 
effect of various informal social controls on employee behaviour in organisational 
settings, such as social bonds (Ifinedo, 2014), social pressure (Cheng et al., 2013; Guo 
and Yuan, 2012), influence of top management (Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010), and 
cultural factors (Hovav and DÕArcy, 2012; Vroom and von Solms, 2004). While it has 
long been the established wisdom that there is a link between organisational culture 
(OC) and behaviour (Baker, 1980), our literature search found only two conceptual 
papers within mainstream outlets that argued that OC culture is a strong predictor of 
employee security behaviour (von Solms and von Solms, 2004; Vroom and von Solms, 
2004). In calling for more studies to be conducted in this area, Hu et al. (2012, p.617) 
argue that the effect of OC, which is Òone of the key constructs in organisational and 
individual behaviour literatureÓ, on information security has not been rigorously 
examined.  
Therefore, taking into consideration the aforementioned research gaps, the objective 
of our study is to answer the following research questions: 
¥! How do procedural security countermeasures affect employee security 
behaviour? 
¥! How do organisational culture values affect employee security behaviour in 
organisational settings? 
By answering these questions, this research helps to fill a void in the literature as it 
focuses on behavioural aspects as opposed to technical issues. Additionally, practical 
implications are revealed, as it is significant for IT managers to understand factors that 
affect employee security behaviour. 
2.! Theoretical Context 
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Please insert Figure 1 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
Our proposed theoretical model, shown in Figure 1, integrates organisational culture 
values, procedural security countermeasures, information security awareness, and 
employee security behaviour. General Deterrence Theory (GDT) and prior 
organisational culture literature underpin this model. This framework expands GDT 
by including procedural security countermeasures as factors that tend to increase 
employee information security awareness. In turn, employee awareness about 
organisational information security requirements, security threats and consequences 
of illicit actions is inclined to lead to compliant behaviour. That is, procedural security 
countermeasures influence employee security behaviour indirectly through employee 
security awareness. Commonly, GDT is employed to study negative behaviours, while 
we include both negative and positive, further extending this theory. 
2.1.! General Deterrence Theory  
The theory of deterrence relies on three individual components: severity, certainty, and 
celerity of sanctions. Based on the rational choice view of human behaviour, GDT is 
based upon the central proposition that illicit behaviour can be controlled by the threat 
of sanctions. Therefore, GDT focuses on disincentives against committing a criminal 
act and the effect of these disincentives on deterring others from committing deviant 
acts (Blumstein et al., 1978). The original theory assumes that if a punishment is 
severe, certain and swift, a rationally calculating human being will measure the gains 
and losses before engaging in crime and will desist from a criminal act if the loss is 
greater than the gain. Therefore, GDT posits that Òpeople respond to policing and the 
punishment that is associated with the effective policingÓ (Straub, 1990, p. 258).  
Classic GDT has been widely employed in the IS security context under the 
presumption that employees choose to engage in inappropriate behaviour and 
therefore, organisational sanctions will prevent deviant actions of employees and deter 
computer abuse (DÕArcy et al., 2014). GDT has been further extended and policing is 
being associated with security countermeasures, including information security 
policies (Lee et al., 2004), security education (Barlow et al., 2013), and technical 
controls (DÕArcy and Hovav, 2007), assuming that these controls also deter illicit 
actions of individuals. Therefore, in keeping with the rationale of GDT, security 
researchers and practitioners generally believe that organisations can reduce IS misuse 
by implementing anti-virus software, using password protection systems, enforcing 
information security policies, and fostering employee information security awareness 
through effective security education programs. 
2.2.! Procedural Security Countermeasures 
Organisational strategies for reducing IS misuse generally fall into four stages Ð 
deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery. These four stages are collectively 
referred to as the Security Action Cycle (Straub and Welke, 1998). Based on this 
model, effective IS security management should aim to maximise the number of 
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deterred and prevented incidents of non-compliant behaviour and minimise those that 
are detected and punished. Our study concentrates on stage one of the Security Action 
Cycle Ð that is, deterrent mechanisms for the effective management of employee 
security behaviour. In accordance with Straub and WelkeÕs (1998) framework, this 
phase refers to the use of deterrent security countermeasures such as information 
security policies and security education in order to encourage desirable behaviour.  
An information security policy defines rules and guidelines for the proper use of 
organisational IS resources. In line with a deterrence perspective, security policies rely 
on the same fundamental mechanisms as societal laws, Ð that is outlining knowledge 
of what constitutes illicit behaviour increases the perceived threat of punishment for 
unacceptable actions (DÕArcy et al., 2009). Security education has a similar deterrent 
effect through ongoing security training. The ultimate purpose of training is to remind 
users of the guidelines regarding the acceptable usage of information systems and the 
potential outcomes in the event that users circumvent the outlined rules.  
2.3.! Organisational Culture 
The study of culture is rooted in sociology, social psychology, and anthropology (Ali 
and Brooks, 2009). Culture has been studied for over a hundred years in various 
disciplines. As a result, numerous definitions, conceptualisations, and dimensions of 
culture were produced by researchers. For example, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) 
identified 164 definitions of culture. Kovačić (2005) argued that since then the number 
of definitions has increased to approximately 400. They range from simple to complex, 
incorporate and extend previous definitions, and even contradict prior definitions. 
Furthermore, some researchers offer more than one definition of culture. Therefore, 
studying culture can be a delicate assignment. As Straub et al. (2002, p.14) put it, 
Òculture has always been a thorny concept and an even thornier research constructÓ. 
OC is defined in this research project as Òculture shared between people working in an 
organisationÓ (Ali and Brooks, 2009, p. 550). Prior research shows that OC has an 
impact on individualsÕ behaviour. For example, Kilmann (1985) describes OC as a 
separate and hidden force that controls behaviours and attitudes in organisations. A 
study conducted by Porter and McLaughlin (2006) further demonstrated the significant 
role that organisational climate plays in shaping employee behaviour. Philips (1984) 
portrays culture as a set of tacit assumptions that guide acceptable perceptions, 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviour among members of the group. Baker (1980) 
emphasised the importance of OC as power that can lead a company to success or 
weaken its vitality, because organisational culture directly affects employee behaviour 
in an organisation. 
2.4.! Organisational Culture Values 
OC has been conceptualised in terms of values that distinguish one organisation from 
another. The literature on OC has identified quite a variety of organisational values 
that may present themselves (Leidner and Kayworth, 2006). For the purposes of our 
study (as explained in section 3), we focussed on a confined set of OC values, namely 
people-orientation, solidarity, sociability, task-orientation, and flat structure, and 
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investigated the impact of these values on individualsÕ behaviour. The organisational 
value of people-orientation refers to organisations that are Òconcerned with people 
issuesÓ (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987, p. 52). Goffee and Jones (1996, p.134) define 
solidarity as Òa measure of communityÕs ability to pursue shared objectives quickly 
and effectively regardless of personal tiesÓ and sociability as Òthe measure of sincere 
friendliness among members of a communityÓ. Task-orientation is defined as 
Òconcern for efficiencyÓ (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987, p.54). Finally, flat structure is an 
organisational structure that aims to reduce Òthe number of layers of management 
hierarchyÓ (Kettley, 1995, p.1). 
2.5.! Employee Security Behaviour 
The subject of our interest in this study is employee security behaviour, which is 
defined as Òthe behaviour of employees in using organisational information systems 
(including hardware, software, and network systems etc.), and such behaviour may 
have security implicationsÓ (Guo, 2013, p. 243). Examples of employee security 
behaviour include how members of staff handle their passwords, how they deal with 
organisational data, and how they use network resources (Guo, 2013). This behaviour 
may either pose or moderate organisational IS security threats. 
The two types of employee security behaviour that we examined were compliant 
behaviour (i.e. adhering to the policies, procedures, and norms of an organisation in 
relation to information security) and non-compliant behaviour (i.e. intentional but non-
malicious behaviours of employees that may put organisational information systems 
at risk and entail non-compliance to the policies, procedures, and norms of an 
organisation in relation to information security).  
2.6.! The Role of Information Security Awareness 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010, p. 532) define information security awareness as Òan 
employeeÕs overall knowledge and understanding of potential information security-
related issues and their ramifications, and what needs to be done in order to deal with 
security-related issuesÓ. Security-aware employees are familiar with the security 
practices and rules of an organisation as well as their responsibilities regarding 
organisational information resources and the consequences of abusing them, including 
loss of reputation, substantial financial losses, and even complete disruption of 
business. When employees understand the purpose of organisational security 
requirements, they tend to conform with organisational security rules (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). 
Prior research confirms that public awareness can reduce certain illicit acts like drunk 
driving (Ferguson et al., 1999), shoplifting (Sacco, 1985), and workplace drug use 
(Quazi, 1993). Furthermore, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) and DÕArcy et al. (2009) 
emphasised the important role of user security awareness in encouraging compliant 
behaviour. Procedural security countermeasures are important organisational artifacts 
that raise employee awareness regarding potential security threats and consequences 
of devious behaviour (DÕArcy et al., 2009). In turn, the increased awareness has a 
positive impact upon security-related behaviours because employees tend to 
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understand the importance of following organisational information security rules 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
3.! Research Approach 
Our intention was to explore employee security behaviour from the perspective of 
study participants and to obtain rich qualitative findings that will help us to better 
understand it. The methodology adapted for this study draws on the analytical 
grounded theory approach (Matavire and Brown, 2013) employing the constant 
comparative method as elucidated by Maykut and Morehouse (1994). The method 
used in this study is characterised by a mix of description and interpretation of data, 
the outcome of which is an interpretive-explanatory framework supported by 
participantsÕ quotes. 
Data collection was carried out using semi-structured in-person interviews. The 
interview guide was constructed following a thorough analysis of the literature. 
Questions were asked about OC values, procedural security countermeasures, 
information security awareness and the impact of these factors on employee security 
behaviour. As regards the questions about OC, there is a wide range of OC models 
employed within IS research. A list of the most prominent OC frameworks was 
borrowed from Leidner and KayworthÕs (2006) work, producing over 20 
organisational values. These values were then grouped into broader categories due to 
their evident similarities, including people-orientation, solidarity, sociability, 
hierarchy, task-orientation, and rule-orientation, and interview questions were 
constructed around these themes. Interview guide topics including corresponding 
references and questions are illustrated in Table 1. 
Please insert Table 1 
In total, 19 individuals were selected for interviews, drawn from organisations across 
a range of industry sectors. Nine interviews were conducted in the United States and 
ten in Ireland. Details about the interviewees and their organisations are given in Table 
2. As the interviews progressed, it became evident that we would not be able to make 
conclusions about the influence of hierarchy and rule-orientation on employee 
security behaviour due to insufficient data under these two categories. 
Please insert Table 2 
Organisations and participants were purposefully selected. We felt that it was 
important to interview organisations from a range of industries in order to capture data 
from organisations with various levels of security, our aim being to develop a holistic 
view of the research problem. The initial intent was to interview one person in a 
managerial position and one regular employee in each organisation in order to 
understand the views of both an experienced user and someone with little (if any) 
experience in the area of information security. Although this proved to be difficult due 
to the access issues, out of 19 interviewees that did participate, eight had expert 
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knowledge on the topic of information security, six had very good knowledge, and the 
remaining five had basic knowledge regarding information security. 
The principle of theoretical sampling was employed in order to guide data collection. 
Data collection was divided into four stages. In the opening stage (Stage 1), four US 
organisations of various sizes and with different levels of security were selected, 
particularly RetCoUS, FinCoUS, PublCoUS, and CivEngCoUS. Four interviews, - 
one in each organisation, - were conducted. This data was analysed (Phases 1 and 2 of 
data analysis) in order to guide further data collection. Phase 1 of data analysis 
involved the segmentation of the body of data into discrete ÔincidentsÕ (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). In Phase 2, a set of first-round provisional categories was generated, to 
which the segmented data would be coded. These categories took two forms: 
participant-driven and researcher-driven. Having segmented and labelled the body of 
data and generated a set of first-round provisional categories, one-third of incidents or 
units were examined and placed into one or more of these categories and analysis of 
their content gave rise to the formation of additional provisional categories. As the 
process unfolded, connections between emerged categories started to arise, including 
both positive and negative cases (see Table 3). 
Please insert Table 3 
Following the emerged associations between the aforementioned concepts, the next 
step of data collection (Stage 2) was to interview organisations where procedural 
security countermeasures were either present or absent in order to find out how these 
controls tend to influence security behaviour. Furthermore, we aimed to select 
organisations where the abovementioned organisational culture values would prevail. 
It was also important to choose interviewees with different levels of knowledge in the 
area of information security in order to discover the role of information security 
awareness. To meet this criteria, a short questionnaire was conducted over the phone 
with potential participants. Subsequently, a further five interviews were conducted in 
organisations CloudSerUS, TechCorpUS, and EducInstUS. The body of data was 
analysed again (Phases 1 and 2 of data analysis, see Figure 1) and provisional results 
have confirmed the associations emerged in Stage 1. 
Next, the same process was repeated in Ireland. In particular, Stage 3 involved 
selecting comparable organisations in terms of the size and level of security, including 
BankOrgIrl, CharOrgIrl, ResRegIrl, BevCorpIrl, and PublOrgIrl. Five interviews were 
conducted in these organisations (one in each organisation) and subsequently analysed 
(Phases 1 and 2 of data analysis). Concepts and associations between these concepts 
started to emerge and were identical to the provisional findings discovered in the US 
organisations interviewed in Stage 1 of data collection (please refer to Table 3). 
Therefore, the selection criteria for Stage 4 was identical to the criteria used to choose 
organisations in the United States for Stage 2. Three organisations located in Ireland 
(TechCorpIrl, TelCommCorpIrl, and EducOrgIrl), which w re comparable with the 
US organisations selected in Stage 2 in terms of the size and level of security, were 
chosen for further interviewing. Five more interviews were conducted in these 
organisations. The interviews were transcribed and analysed (Phases 1 and 2 of data 
analysis) and the results confirmed the associations that had emerged in Stages 1 and 
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3 (Table 3). It is important to note that our studyÕs findings are based on the data 
combined from both data sets Ð US and Ireland). 
The following phase of data analysis (Phase 3 - Coding on) involved merging both 
data sets and further breaking down incidents of data identified in the first phase in 
order to offer a more in-depth understanding of the highly qualitative aspects and offer 
clearer insights into the meaning embedded therein. In Phase 4, the provisional 
categories identified in the second phase were analysed for their characteristics and 
properties so as to develop a Ôrule for inclusionÕ in the form of a propositional 
statement, coupled with sample data. As a Ôrule of inclusionÕ was developed for each 
category, the remaining two thirds of the data segments were analysed, compared and 
coded. As the constant comparative procedure progressed, data incidents that fitted 
with a Ôrule for inclusionÕ, validated that category and emerging theoretical insights. 
Furthermore, data incidents that failed to fit with existing categories, generated leads 
to the formation of additional categories. Over the course of this analytical process, 
categories underwent various changes: while some were substantiated quickly, others 
were eliminated as irrelevant to the focus of inquiry; some were merged due to 
overlaps or needed to be redefined, and new categories emerged. Subsequently, data 
reduction (Phase 5) was performed in order to emphasise findings relevant to the 
objectives of this study. Finally, Phase 6 involved writing analytical memos and 
validating the proposed findings by seeking evidence in data. Eisenhardt (1989) argued 
that theoretical saturation is reached when a researcher is observing phenomena that 
have been seen before and therefore, incremental learning becomes minimal. We felt 
that we had reached the point of theoretical saturation after 19 interviews had been 
conducted. 
4.! Research Findings and Discussion 
Our findings indicate that procedural security countermeasures and OC values tend to 
affect employee security behaviour in organisational settings (Fig. 1). In particular, 
information security policy and security education tend to increase information 
security awareness. This awareness, in turn, is inclined to lead to compliant behaviour. 
Furthermore, OC values of solidarity and people-orientation are positively associated 
with security behaviours, while sociability, and task-orientation tend to have a 
negative effect on security-related actions. Additionally, a flat structure is inclined to 
encourage employees to address issues related to information security and therefore, 
improves the overall level of information security in organisations. 
4.1.! Information Security Policy 
Study informants from ClousSerUS, TechCorpIrl, TechCorpUS, and RetCoUS 
suggest that a policy tends to increase employee security awareness. At TechCorpIrl, 
information security is a top priority so there is a detailed information security policy 
in place that outlines organisational information security requirements and instructs 
employees in terms of appropriate and inappropriate actions. Their Product Manager 
expressed his view that: 
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Ò[when a security policy is present], people are very conscious of what is 
appropriate and what is not appropriate because the policy dictates what they 
can do and what they cannot do...Ó 
As another example, a Software Developer from ClousSerUS believes that the 
information security policy tends to increase information security awareness and 
hence, leads to compliant behaviour. He stresses that when the information security 
policy is present, employees understand what ÒgoodÓ and what ÒbadÓ behaviour is and 
act accordingly: 
 ÒWhen there are no security policies, employees generally do not know what 
is right and what is wrong... therefore, employees are probably more 
susceptible to doing something that one may not think is wrong. [When policy 
is present], people are very conscious of what is appropriate and what is not 
appropriate because the policy dictates what they can do and what they cannot 
doÉÓ 
Our findings demonstrate that a security policy tends to enhance awareness about 
information security. Typically, a security policy aims to outline organisational 
information security requirements and the rules that derive from these requirements. 
Furthermore, security policies provide information on sanctions in the event of non-
compliant behaviour, and rewards to encourage compliant behaviour. Our findings are 
consistent with Straub (1990) and Chan et al. (2005), confirming that the establishment 
of information security policies in organisations is vital to encourage security 
compliant behaviour. However, in contrast with Straub (1990) and Chan et al. (2005), 
we found that security policies affect employee actions indirectly through information 
security awareness. The notion of information security awareness, as distinct from 
security policy, has been largely overlooked in prior research. The surprising finding 
of Lee et al. (2004) that an information security policy has no impact on IS misuse 
behaviour, which is at odds with our findings, could be explained by the employeesÕ 
lack of awareness in the first instance of the security policy. It is not merely enough to 
formulate security policy; awareness of policy must be promulgated through 
appropriate education and training of staff. 
4.2.! Security Education 
Study participants from CloudSerUS, TechCorpUS, TechCorpIrl, and CharOrgIrl 
reveal that security education tends to increase employee information security 
awareness. An IT Executive from TechCorpIrl comments: 
 ÒWhen a new member of staff starts, they have to do a generic training to 
increase their understanding [about security], so that they do not compromise 
the company...Ó 
Conversely, study participants from organisations such as BankOrgIrl, EducOrgIrl, 
TelCommCorpIrl, and CivEngCoUS, share that the lack of security education tends to 
lead to the lack of information security awareness. For example, a Security Executive 
of TechCorpIrl notes: 
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ÒA lot of security issues are associated with human ignorance. I think there is 
an aspect of what people do not know. If they do not know, it then causes the 
gaps and exposures.Ó  
Overall, our results demonstrate that security education tends to enhance awareness 
about information security. The purpose of security training is to educate employees 
on how to protect vital organisational assets and why a certain set of rules must be 
implemented. The ÔwhyÕ is particularly important because if employees underestimate 
the significance of a certain rule, they may not be able to justify the extra effort they 
need to make in order to follow the rule, and, consequently, violate information 
security requirements. Additionally, when employees fail to understand the reason 
behind security rules, they may give inaccurate interpretation of their presence and, 
consequently, misjudge the importance of security requirements. 
Security education appeals to employeesÕ conscience by providing details of dreadful 
consequences that an organisation may experience in the event of a security breach. 
Fear appeals are induced when consequences for the offender are outlined during 
security education sessions. Once all these aspects are covered through security 
education (e.g. how to protect sensitive information, why there is a need to follow 
rules, consequences of non-conformity for both the organisation and the offender), 
employees become security-conscious and therefore, are inclined to follow rules. In 
contrast with the previous finding of Lee et al. (2004) that awareness programs have 
no significant impact on behaviour, we found that security education tends to lead to 
compliant behaviour. Furnell et al. (2002) argued that user information security 
knowledge is critical to ensure compliance and can be delivered to end-users through 
education and training. While studies by Straub (1990), Siponen et al. (2009), and 
Barlow et al. (2013) indicated that security education has a direct effect on employee 
security actions, it must be noted that information security awareness is an outcome of 
security education and therefore, security education tends to lead to compliant 
behaviour indirectly, through security awareness.  
4.3.! Information Security Awareness 
Study participants from CloudSerUS, CharOrgIrl, TechCorpUS, and EducInstUS 
share that employee security awareness tends to lead to compliant behaviour. In 
particular, a Software Developer from CloudSerUS reports the following: 
ÒWhen [employees] generally know that there is a good reason for not doing 
something, they tend to adhere to the information security policyÉ But if 
[employees] do not know, then it is bad...Ó 
On the other hand, study informants from BevCorpIrl, EducOrgIrl, and EducInstUS 
report that the lack of information security awareness prompts employees to 
circumvent information security rules or exercise poor practices. An IT Executive 
from BevCorpIrl shares: 
 ÒInformation security rules are useful... But I can see why people circumvent 
them. Employees are not seeing the implications of why the rule is in place.  So 
they just see it as a challenge to bypass a systemÉÓ 
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The above statements confirm that employee information security awareness is an 
important factor that tends to promote compliant behaviour. In particular, study 
participants reveal that when employees understand that there is a good reason behind 
a certain rule, they exercise safe practices. Knowledge about consequences of non-
compliant behaviour is vital. On the other hand, when employees do not understand 
why a certain rule is in place, they try to bypass it as they perceive it as a barrier to 
perform their main duties. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) and DÕArcy et al. (2009) confirmed 
the important role of information security awareness, suggesting that when users are 
aware that security policies exist, they are less likely to engage in IS policies misuse. 
Our findings are in accord with these studies. Although Lee et al. (2004) reported that 
degree of security awareness has no impact on employeesÕ actions, our results show 
the opposite.  
4.4.! People-Orientation 
In both Ireland and US, several informants from TechCorpIrl, BankOrgIrl, CharOrgIrl, 
BevCorpIrl, CloudSerUS, RetCoUS, TechCorpUS, FinCoUS believe that high people-
orienation encourages information security compliance, while low people-orientation 
tends to have a negative effect on employee security behaviour as expressed by 
interviewees from BevCorpIrl, EducOrgIrl, and CivEngCoUS. For example, RetCoUS 
puts a high value on employee satisfaction and ensures their membersÕ happiness and 
health in order to promote information security compliance. A Security Executive 
from RetCoUS shares: 
ÒI think satisfaction could affect employee security behaviour in a sense that if 
people are happy and healthy, they are more likely to follow rules and be more 
willing to go that extra mile when they are doing their jobÓ. 
Our data impels us to conclude that an organisational value of people-orientation tends 
to lead to compliant behaviour. When an organisation takes care of its employees, they 
feel satisfied in their jobs. The satisfaction refers to the employeesÕ state of 
contentment with their organisation. Sources of satisfaction could be good working 
conditions (e.g. bright office, fast computer), an excellent reward/benefit system, 
opportunities to grow and realise potential (e.g. promotions), or job security. These 
results are in line with prior studies. In particular, Danish and Usman (2010) concluded 
that rewards and recognition are important predictors of employee work motivation. 
Xue et al. (2011) reported that employee satisfaction has a positive impact on their 
compliance with organisational information security requirements. Furthermore, 
Probst and Brubaker (2001) found out that employee who report high perceptions of 
job insecurity exhibit decreased safety motivation and compliance. Hence, 
organisations should strive to cultivate a value of people-orientation in order to 
encourage compliance with information security rules. 
4.5.! Solidarity 
In both countries, four study participants from CloudSerUS, TechCorpUS, and 
EducOrgIrl believe that a high level of solidarity is inclined to promote compliant 
behaviour.  For example, CloudSerUS is an organisation that highly values the security 
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of their assets and therefore, has in place various security measures and controls to 
protect valuable information. Employees realise a companyÕs goal as regards to 
information security and demonstrate their solidarity by following information 
security rules. A Software Developer from CloudSerUS shared his view: 
ÒEverybody understands that security is a big concern from a lot of 
aspectsÉpeople do tend to adhere to a policy just because it is there... nobody 
has tried to violate information security rulesÓ. 
We found that when employees realise and share organisational goals, and the goal is 
to protect sensitive information, they are more likely to comply with organisational 
security requirements. Furthermore, if employees understand that, generally, 
exercising good security practices is important for their organisation, they follow safe 
practices even if the organisation itself does not enforce them. Hence, solidarity 
encourages behaviour that supports an organisation. These results are in accordance 
with contemporary literature. In particular, Long (1978) demonstrated a link between 
employee ownership and behaviour that supports the organisation. Guo and Yuan 
(2012) reported that employees prefer to conduct within social norms of their 
particular workgroup. Cheng et al. (2013) concluded that attachment to oneÕs 
organisation and commitment discourage security violations in organisations. 
Therefore, it is important to promote solidarity among employees, which can be done 
via a good be efit system, favourable working conditions, and opportunities to realise 
potential. 
4.6.! Sociability 
In both countries, study participants from EducInstUS, CharOrgIrl, EducOrgIrl, 
TelCommCorpIrl, and ResRegIrl suggest that high sociability tends to encourage non-
compliant behaviour. For example, a Software Developer from TelCommCorpIrl 
shares: 
ÒPeople are probably more lax in terms of information security because of a 
friendly atmosphere...If the PC police were beside our cubicle, we would be all 
fired a long time ago...especially a guy beside me...we always slag him that the 
HR are coming for him.Ó 
Although high sociability forms a special bond between employees, where employees 
begin to trust each other and work as a team, it may also create an informal atmosphere 
and therefore, drive wrong behaviours. Organisational members may not take any 
form of formality or authority seriously like managers instructions or organisational 
rules. High sociability is therefore detrimental unless management can preserve a 
required level of professionalism. Subsequently, employees will realise that although 
management is friendly, they still represent organisational authority and therefore, 
their orders and instructions are a requirement as the obligation to follow information 
security rules. Although friendliness has a lot of advantages (e.g. openness to new 
ideas, teamwork), there are also drawbacks. For example, the prevalence of friendships 
may allow poor performance to be accepted as no one wants to rebuke or fire a friend 
(Goffee and Jones, 1996). As a result, when rules get broken, it can be deliberately 
overlooked. Rashid et al. (2004) added that a friendly environment can breed 
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mediocrity among employees. Normally, friends are reluctant to disagree with or 
challenge one another, which can lead to an exaggerated concern for consensus and 
subsequently, to a loss of focus on a companyÕs mission and goals. 
4.7.! Task-Orientation 
Study participants from both countries from BevCorpIrl, ResRegIrl, FinCoUS, and 
EducInstUS believe that work pressure pushes them to break rules with regards to 
information security. For example, an IT Executive from BevCorpIrl notes: 
ÒSometimes IT security policies and procedures are a barrier to getting things 
done as quickly and as correctly as possible.  And if you are being rewarded 
for getting stuff done quickerÉit is going to happen [that information security 
rules will be broken].  I definitely think that.Ó 
Task completion implies finishing a particular job within a certain time frame. Often, 
the time frames are unrealistic as they are driven by a desire to satisfy customers by 
all means necessary. Study participants report that unrealistic deadlines or tasks push 
people to take shortcuts and break rules. If there is an imbalance between workload 
and the time allocated to complete tasks or meet deadlines, high task-orientation is 
inclined to have a negative impact on employee security behaviour. 
This inference is confirmed in the extant literature (Albrechtsen, 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). For example, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) argued that commonly employees perceive 
information security rules as inconvenience and obstruction to meet daily work 
requirements. Albrechtsen (2007) concluded that employees circumvent information 
security rules if the rules are a barrier to productivity. In organisations that put high 
emphasis on results, employees may feel oppressed due to continuous stress and 
pressure, which may result in negative feelings about an organisation. In turn, ill 
feelings can have a negative effect on employee compliance with information security 
rules (Cavallari, 2012). 
Therefore, it is up to organisational leaders to find a balance between employeesÕ daily 
commitments and information security requirements. Our results indicate that security 
staff should take feedback from employees and adjust security requirements 
accordingly. It is meaningless to have rules in place that are impossible or hard to 
implement in practice. Top management and security staff should work as one unit in 
order to find the balance between employee workload and their obligations related to 
information security.  
4.8.! Flat Structure 
The organisational value of flat structure has emerged as the opposite value to 
hierarchy. Study participants from PublCoUS, RetCoUS, TechCorpUS, FinCoUS, 
TechCorpIrl, TelCommCorpIrl, CloudSerUS, and CharOrgIrl believe that flat 
structure tends to improve the overall level of security in organisations. When 
management is open to suggestions, employees freely express their concerns and 
problems, which, in turn, may improve the level of information security in 
organisations.  For example, an IT Executive from TechCorpIrl shares that 
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management tends to encourage employees to speak their mind in order to improve 
their processes:  
ÒI am approachable...I guess this would just reinforce the strength of 
information security because I believe if people were to feel there was some 
type of a problem or issue, they would not hesitate to talk to me about itÓ. 
Our results suggest that flat structure tends to improve information security. In 
particular, accessibility and approachability of management increases visibility for 
information security throughout the organisation. Furthermore, if employees become 
aware of any problem, they are more likely to express their concerns to a manager and 
possibly improve current processes or rules, which will benefit an organisation in the 
long-run. Acquiring user perspective on some issues is especially important because 
managers or policy makers may not be familiar with all aspects of working 
environments. 
This finding is in line with results reported in the extant literature. In particular, 
Chipperfield and Furnell (2010) stressed that in flatter organisations, management is 
easy to approach and therefore employees freely address concerns. Pearson (1987) 
asserted that a flat structure empowers employees to protect organisational interests 
because employees and leaders share a common set of values and feel personal 
ownership for the success of their organisation. As a result, employees will not hesitate 
to speak up if any issues arise. Furthermore, Lim et al. (2009) asserted that in 
organisations where management is opened to discussions and all members are 
involved in security affairs, employees tend to feel responsible to adhere to 
organisational security procedures and guides. 
5.! Conclusion 
Our results show that information security policies and security education tend to 
increase employee information security awareness. In turn, the awareness is inclined 
to lead to compliant behaviour. These insights extend general deterrence theory in a 
novel way. In particular, the deterrent effect of procedural security countermeasures 
increases information security awareness. This awareness, in turn, tends to prevent 
malicious actions of employees and encourage security-cautious behaviour. 
Furthermore, general deterrence theory is typically used to study negative behaviours, 
while there are calls in the literature to apply the theory across the variety of 
behaviours, including negative and positive (DÕArcy and Herath, 2011). The focus of 
this study is both negative and positive behaviours, which further extends general 
deterrence theory. 
Furthermore, OC values are inclined to have an effect on employee security behaviour 
in organisational settings. Study participants reveal that high people-oriented 
organisations benefit from a satisfied workforce, which in turn motivates employees 
to comply with information security rules. Moreover, high solidarity tends to lead to 
compliant behaviour because employees realise and pursue organisational goals. Next, 
high sociability and high task-orientation tend to encourage non-compliant behaviour. 
Finally, flat structure is inclined to improve the overall level of information security 
in an organisation. 
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This study makes an important research contribution. The extant security research 
tends to focus on technical issues as opposed to the behaviour of individual users. On 
the contrary, our study builds on general deterrence theory and prior organisational 
culture literature to make an empirical contribution, which takes its place amongst the 
very few studies in Behavioural InfoSec research that investigate how procedural 
security countermeasures and organisational culture affect employee security 
behaviour. Further, prior studies that investigate the impact of procedural security 
countermeasures on employee security behaviour report contradictory and therefore, 
inconclusive results. This research provides empirical evidence that procedural 
security countermeasures, including information security policies and security 
education, tend to lead to compliant behaviour. Moreover, prior research that focuses 
on procedural security countermeasures, tend to investigate the direct effect of these 
measures on employee security behaviour. Therefore, the role of information security 
awareness has been neglected in the extant literature. Our research emphasises the 
important role of information security awareness.  
Our results also have important practical implications. First, this study highlights the 
important role of procedural security countermeasures in managing illicit actions in 
organisations. Security practitioners must realise that focusing on technical measures 
alone puts organisations at higher risk of security breaches occurring due to Òhuman 
errorÓ. Second, since information security awareness is the key factor in encouraging 
compliant behaviour, IS security managers must design security education and policies 
with the aim increasing awareness about security threats and consequences of 
information security breaches. In particular, real life incidents should be part of 
security education. Employee awareness that a security breach may lead to 
organisationÕs bankruptcy and complete shutdown and consequently, their job loss, 
would be a strong drive to comply with organisational information security 
requirements. Third, security practitioners must take into consideration the effect of 
OC values on employee security behaviour. Organisational culture can be assessed 
and changed if required. 
An additional and important contribution of this study is in its methodology. While 
studies in the Behavioural InfoSec field make a valuable contribution to the pool of 
Behavioural InfoSec research, quantitative methodologies prevail in this research 
stream. Crossler et al. (2013), however, brought attention to the methodological 
challenges of quantitative methods and called for more studies that employ alternative 
methods, including qualitative. Moreover, Straub (1990) pointed out that Òqualitative 
studies would enhance our [quantitative] perspective.Ó In particular, in our study we 
had a personal contact with interviewees, which allowed to probe and hence, grasp a 
deeper understanding of the central phenomenon of this study, that is security 
behaviour in organisations, as well as factors that tend to affect employee actions. 
In terms of study limitations, US data was collected in organisations located in the Bay 
Area, California. The US is a vast country and different parts have distinctive 
characteristics. For example, the Californian Bay Area is home to Silicon Valley, and 
therefore is home to a great number of achievers. This culture may have a certain 
influence on employee security behaviour as opposed to the less competitive culture 
that prevails in some other parts of the US. 
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Furthermore, one of the main concerns with qualitative studies is the generalisability 
of research findings. As this study is exploratory in nature, it is not attempting to 
generalise the findings but rather to present uniqueness within its context. Therefore, 
study results cannot be generalised at a country level because as with most of 
qualitative studies, the sample is too small. Future research would benefit from 
conducting a quantitative study that would confirm generalisability of the 
aforementioned findings. Nevertheless, this research builds on existing theories to 
make an empirical contribution, which takes its place amongst the very few studies in 
Behavioural InfoSec research that investigate how procedural security 
countermeasures and organisational culture affect employee security behaviour.  
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Elements of Conceptual 
Framework 
Reference Examples of questions 
Information Security 
Policy  
Cheng et al. (2013) Is there an information security policy in your organisation? 
Security Education DÕArcy et al. (2009) Do you ever attend information security training courses in your organisation? 
Information Security 
Awareness 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) What information security rules and practices are used in your organisation? 
Pe ple-orientation Cooke and Lafferty 
(1987) 
How satisfying is the organisation you are working for with respect to 
employee benefits? 
Solidarity Goffee and Jones 
(1996) 
Do you ever voluntarily work overtime in order to complete some important 
task? 
Sociability Goffee and Jones 
(1996) 
Is it common to have non-work related chats with your colleagues during work 
hours? 
Hierarchy Ouchi (1981) Is it easy to approach your immediate manager? 
Task-orientation Cooke and Lafferty 
(1987) 
Do you think management expects you to put company goals before your 
personal goals? 
Rule-orientation Hofstede (1991) Is it acceptable to break rules in your organisation? 
Security Behaviour Albrechtsen (2007) Did your organisation ever experience an information security breach? If yes, 
did this incident affect your behaviour with regards to information security? If 
yes, then how? 
Table 1: Interview Guide Topics 
Organisation Name 
(aliases) 
Industry type; Year 
founded; size 
Number of people interviewed and their 
roles 
CloudSerUS IT; 1998; large One person Ð Software Developer 
RetCoUS Finance; 1932; large One person Ð Security Executive 
CivEngCoUS Civil Engineering; 1945; 
SME 
One person Ð Civil Engineer 
TechCorpUS IT; 1968; large Two people Ð both Security Researchers 
EducInstUS Education; 1868; large Two people Ð Administrator and Professor 
with expertise in IS security  
FinCoUS Finance; 1982; large One person Ð Security Consultant 
PublCoUS Publishing; 2005; SME One person Ð Business Owner 
TechCorpIrl IT; 1968; large Two people Ð Product Manager and IT 
Executive 
CharOrgIrl Charity; 1883; large One person Ð Data Protection Officer 
BevCorpIrl Food and Beverage 
Manufacturing; 1944; large 
One person Ð IT Executive 
PublOrgIrl Publishing; 2000; SME One person Ð Chief Editor 
EducOrgIrl Education; 1845; large Two people Ð Administrator and Lecturer 
with expertise in IS security 
TelCommCorpIrl IT; 1984; large One person Ð Software Developer 
ResRegIrl Energy Regulation; 1999; 
SME 
One person Ð Policy Analyst 
BankOrgIrl Finance; 1982; large One person Ð Security Executive 
Table 2: Profile of US and Irish IntervieweesÕ Organisations 
Emerged Associations 
Information Security Policy and Increased Information Security Awareness 
Lack of Information Security Policy and Lack of Information Security Awareness 
Security Education and Increased Information Security Awareness 
Lack of Security Education and Lack of Information Security Awareness 
Increased Information Security Awareness and Compliant Behaviour 
Lack of Information Security Awareness and Non-Compliant Behaviour 
High People-Orientation and Compliant Behaviour 
Low People-Orientation and Non-Compliant Behaviour 
High Solidarity and Compliant Behaviour 
Low Solidarity and Non-Compliant Behaviour 
High Sociability and Non-Compliant Behaviour 
High Task-Orientation and Non-Compliant Behaviour 
Flat Structure and Improved Information Security 
Table 3: Results of Phases 1 and 2 (US interviews) 
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